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Business Model Warfare
The Strategy of Business Breakthroughs
Langdon Morris1
Abstract
There’s a story behind every business success and every business fail-
ure, sometimes the story of a great idea; sometimes one that failed. 
Sometimes it’s a story of insightful management, or management that 
failed.  But almost always it’s a story about change.  Change in the mar-
ket; change in the economy; change in a particular product or service that 
transformed a failure into a success, or vice versa.  Hidden behind many of 
these changes, or sometimes as a result of them, there is change in what 
customers experience, and as a result, a change in their perceptions and 
attitudes, and then in their buying habits.  Companies soar, or collapse, 
as a consequence.  While we study the stories to learn about the specific 
changes, events, insights, and breakdowns in each case, we also look for 
broader and deeper explanations that show how change applies across 
industries and the whole of the economy. The broader patterns are often 
Business Model Innovations, the subject of this white paper.  Here we pro-
pose a specific model explaining how large companies create and sustain 
market leadership in today’s market, or the traps that they fall into that 
prevent them from doing so.
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Introduction
The average lifespan of a major corporation isn’t very 
long.  The rate of change throughout the economy 
is such that a surprising number of new companies 
are being born and then growing to be quite large 
very quickly.  At the same time, many older and well 
established firms are falling by the wayside just as 
fast, or faster.  Hence, just because a company is listed 
in the S&P 500 or the Fortune 500, or any other of the 
biggest and most powerful and influential firms does 
not mean that it can look forward to a long and happy 
life ahead, as the mortality rate is high, and increasing. 
Many companies that we today consider to be leaders 
will be gone by tomorrow, or the day after, while 
companies that we haven’t yet heard of, and indeed 
which may not even exist today, may will in many cases 
become next week’s industry giants.1  
This problem of accelerating change is one of the most 
challenging issues facing business and government 
leaders today, not only in the developed world, but 
everywhere.
In these turbulent markets where companies that were 
once dominant are struggling to survive, managers are 
constantly probing to understand what makes the 
difference between success and failure.  
Looking at the recent past, for example, we might 
ask what happened to Nokia, or Blackberry, or Kodak, 
or Sony, Sears, Xerox, Blockbuster, Pontiac, Lehman 
Brothers, and so many other great brand names.  Why 
was GM’s Saturn subsidiary a breakthrough in the 1990s 
and 100% dead in 2008?  At the same time, how did 
Google, Facebook, Amazon, Fedex, Charles Schwab, and 
Home Depot become so big so fast, so widely admired? 
There’s a story behind every business success and every 
business failure, sometimes the story of a great idea; 
sometimes one that failed.  Sometimes it’s a story of 
insightful management, or management that failed. 
But almost always it’s a story about change.  Change 
in the market; change in the economy; change in a 
particular product or service that transformed a failure 
into a success, or vice versa.  Hidden behind many 
of these changes, or sometimes as a result of them, 
there is change in what customers experience, and as 
a result, a change in their perceptions and attitudes, 
and then in their buying habits.  Companies soar, or 
collapse, as a consequence.
While we study the stories to learn about the specific 
changes, events, insights, and breakdowns in each 
case, we also look for broader and deeper explanations 
that show how change applies across industries and 
the whole of the economy.
The broader patterns are the subject of this white 
paper.  Here we propose a specific model explaining how 
large companies create and sustain market leadership 
in today’s market, or the traps that they fall into that 
prevent them from doing so. 
Part I:  The Mortality of Companies
The capacity of organizations to adapt to rapid and 
unexpected change is frequently discussed, but 
managing for adaptability is a little understood 
and poorly practiced art even as the pace of change 
continues to accelerate.  In reality more big companies 
are going out of business faster than ever before.
In searching for hard data about company mortality we 
found three sources:  The Fortune 500 list, The Forbes 
100 list, and The S&P 500 list.
From the first year the Fortune 500 was created, 
1955, and continuing through 2001 we identified the 
companies that were on the list one year but not the 
subsequent year as living examples of what we might 
call the relentless progression of competition.  Over 
this span of 46 years, an average of 30 companies per 
year left the list.2
In some years there were more departures, in some 
years fewer, but the overall trend showed consistent 
turnover of about 6% each year. 
If the impact of decay was random among companies, 
then over a period of only about 17 years the entire list 
would turn over and an entirely new set of companies 
would be listed.  But of course it doesn’t happen that 
way.  Instead, some companies are ephemeral visitors 
to the Fortune 500, while others endure for decades.  A 
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study by planners at Shell found that by 1983, one-third 
of the companies listed among the 500 in 1970 had not 
only fallen from the list, but had gone out of business 
altogether.3  That’s an average mortality rate of 12 very 
large companies per year, or one per month.  They also 
found that a multi-national corporation comparable in 
size to a Fortune 500 company could only be expected 
to survive for between 40 and 50 years. 
In 1917, Forbes magazine created its own list of the 
largest 100 US companies, and over the seventy-
year span an average of about one company per year 
disappeared.  Of the remaining 39 original companies, 
18 were still large enough to remain on the list in 1987. 
However, of the 18 companies, only two had managed 
to perform better than the overall stock market during 
the seventy-year period.  While the combined annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of US public companies from 
1917 to 1987 was 7.5%, the 18 surviving companies 
managed a combined average of only 5.3%.  In other 
words, an investor in market index funds would have 
done substantially better than an investor in these 18 
companies.  (This assumes, of course, that any investor 
would have had the incredible foresight to pick the 18 
surviving big companies from the original list of 100.) 
The S&P 500 list provides a third reference point.  The 
mortality rate S&P 500 companies has been steadily 
increasing, and the average life span has steadily decreased 
from more than 50 years to fewer than 25 today.4   
The three slices of history convey a clear pattern, and 
projecting the pattern forward suggests that about 
a third of today’s major corporations will survive as 
significant businesses for the next twenty-five years. 
Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan comment that, “Most 
will die or be bought out and absorbed because they 
are too slow to keep pace with change in the market.”5
That’s the key issue – keeping page with change in the 
market; and of course it’s very difficult to do.  Where, 
then, to focus?
Part II:  It’s the Business Model 
The context of business strategy is the marketplace in 
which it is played out, so discussions of strategy must 
begin with reference to market dynamics.  Today, the 
most external critical factors are accelerating change, 
increasing competition, new technology, and increasing 
complexity, while the two major internal drivers are 
innovation and corporate decision making.  
While each of the external ones presents its own 
particular problems, the impact of all four acting 
together significantly compounds the problem, 
composing a “change conspiracy” that increases the 
danger exponentially.  The results are a drastically 
compressed planning horizon for every company, the 
need for faster responses throughout the organization, 
and the accelerating rate of corporate failure as leaders 
simply fail to master these dynamics.
Indeed, these conditions are taking a heavy toll on 
companies, industries, and entire nations, and bringing 
severe stress to the business leaders who grapple with 
these issues day after day.  On the news you’ll hear 
a long list of struggling enterprises, notable not only 
for the steep slide that many have recently endured, 
but also because it was not so long ago that they were 
held in high esteem.  Among them are, as mentioned, 
Nokia, Sony, Kodak, Sears, Xerox, and many others.  
While these companies struggle to right themselves, 
even entire nations struggle to keep their economies 
viable in the new and demanding framework of global 
markets.  A decade ago Argentina, Brazil, and their 
South American neighbors were caught in a deep 
decline; currently Greece, Spain, and Ireland are notable 
for their struggles, while Japan struggles with an 
economic restructuring that has already lasted nearly 
two decades.
The parade of failures makes for dramatic stories that 
are illustrated by the sad losses suffered by individuals 
and families struggling to survive the economic and 
emotional strains, but as more and more companies 
fail, it is becoming clear that these are no longer 
unusual events.  
In spite of the attempts by governments, central banks, 
and multilateral organizations such as the IMF, WTO, 
and the World Bank to reduce the impacts of change, 
it’s evident that the forces of change are far stronger 
than ever before.  Turbulence continues to increase, 
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which means that business failures will continue to be 
common occurrences going forward.  And managers 
wonder obsessively deep into the night, What should 
I be doing differently?
Creative Destruction
While the sense of crisis and the time compression 
caused by the change conspiracy is certainly real, the 
underlying dynamics of the competitive marketplace 
are not new.  In the 1940s the brilliant economist 
Joseph Schumpeter described the overall capitalist 
process as “creative destruction,” and he pointed out 
that the natural behavior of capitalist systems brings 
revolution not as the result of vague external factors, 
but from within.  Change, Schumpeter observed, is 
the common condition of capitalism, not stability. 
And in an utterly prescient comment about prevalent 
management practices at the time (and still today), 
he wrote, “The problem that is usually being visualized 
is how capitalism administers existing structures, 
whereas the relevant problem is how it creates and 
destroys them.”6
The significance of this comment is nearly impossible 
to overstate.  While so many observers and leaders 
focus their attention on how businesses perform in 
today’s markets, Schumpeter points out that it is in 
the very nature of market evolution to weaken some 
companies while creating enticing opportunities 
for others.  Therefore, just as important as today’s 
market structures, or today’s technologies, or today’s 
competitive advantage, is how the forces of change 
will affect a firm tomorrow and the day after.
But unfortunately, the instinctive habit of management 
is to look forward at a 90 day sales forecast and the 
next quarterly report, or backwards to the past, to guide 
a course into the future.  Neither approach is adequate 
to the challenge that is the focus of this paper.
We call this short-term mentality the “logic of 
operations,” and it is characterized by a pattern of 
behavior whose goal is to create a stable, scalable 
enterprise that returns strong, steady profits to its 
stakeholders.  The qualities that are important from 
this perspective include predictability, the capacity to 
forecast future growth, revenues, and profits, and as a 
result tremendous emphasis is placed on management 
of today’s business.  Standardization, policy, procedure, 
organization structure, and short-term decision making 
are tuned and fine tuned.  
The problem, of course, is that the obsession with 
predictable scalability ignores the realities of external 
change, and in an era characterized by the nasty change 
conspiracy, the obsession with the short term cannot 
and does not succeed.  
To take Nokia as a poignant example, it does no good 
to be far and away the globe’s leading cell phone 
maker, the firm with 9 of the top 10 selling phones 
worldwide, as Nokia was in 2007, when the iPhone 
comes along.  Since the introduction of the iPhone, 
Nokia’s market capitalization has dropped from a nice 
high of $150 billion in 2007, to a rather sad $27 billion 
today (February 2014).  That’s $123 billion erased as its 
prospects transformed from bright to dismal.  With 
top management looking backward instead of into 
the future, Nokia did not have a ready response to the 
iPhone.  It quickly became a sad story for a lot of people.
Nokia’s 2007 Annual Report is written in glowing 
language that is highly optimistic.  Military leaders 
are familiar with this problem, which they refer to as 
“preparing to fight the last war.”  Such preparations, 
even fully implemented with rigor and discipline, 
consistently fail if the style of warfare has in the 
interim changed.  Whether it’s armored knights 
slaughtered by the long bow, France’s Maginot Line, 
the 20th century’s iconic monument to backward 
thinking, the Polish horse cavalry that rode out to face 
Hitler’s blitzkrieg, the American army confounded by 
Viet Cong guerrilla fighters, civilian aircraft hijacked 
and turned into guided terrorist missiles, or a new 
class of weapon based on the cell phone, the “IED,” 
“improvised explosive device,” the history of warfare is 
the history of innovations that render past strategies 
ineffective.  This is also the history of business.  
Hence, the relevant question is, What is your strategy 
for dealing with accelerating change?
Part of the challenge with this type of thinking is that 
the misplaced focus is usually evident only in hindsight, 
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when wars, market share, jobs, or stock value have 
already been lost.  You have to find a different way of 
thinking, and a different way of working.
When things are moving so fast, in fact it’s a new kind of 
radar that you need, along with a different approach to 
making decisions.  For business leaders as for generals, 
hindsight does not provide sufficient preparation, and 
it is therefore essential to have an effective way not 
only to look toward the future, but even better, to 
create it.  It is on this imperative of innovation that this 
report will now concentrate.
Innovation
The term “creative destruction” gives us a warning, 
a name, and a general explanation for the waves of 
change that move continually through the marketplace, 
and “fighting the last war” warns us as well that we 
have do it differently if we’re going to survive.  Both 
help us direct our attention toward understanding the 
forces of change rather than supporting the illusion 
of stability, and also remind us that the waves of 
change are themselves created, either intentionally 
or unintentionally, not by mysterious forces, but as 
a result of purposeful innovation in the competitive 
arena of the market.  That’s right … your rivals in the 
marketplace or the battlefield are targeting you.  There 
is a business, or more than one, whose innovative 
thinkers are working right now to take away your share 
of the market, for innovation is indeed the weapon of 
choice.
What is your best response?
Innovations of your own.  
In fact, innovation may be your only possible valid 
response.
However, innovation is a term that means different 
things to different people.  Since it’s a critically 
important concept to this report and to your business, 
we’ll pause here to define it carefully.  
We note, first of all, that the word “innovation” refers 
to an attribute, a process, and a result.  Innovation is a 
process that happens somewhere in your company, or 
perhaps in someone’s mind.  The result, in each case, 
can be an insight, a new idea, a product, a strategy, 
a new or improve business process, or perhaps a 
new business model (we’ll get to defining “business 
model” shortly).  It may be a question, a theory, or just 
a fear.  But whatever it is, one of the qualities that 
will distinguish the new thing is its “innovativeness.” 
This innovativeness refers to its distinctiveness, 
its originality, perhaps its usefulness, and most 
importantly its value.7 
The label “innovation” also refers specifically to 
that new thing itself that the innovation process has 
produced.  To be considered an innovation in business, 
the result must be increased value in the form of 
new or improved functionality, reduced cost, a price 
increase (good for the seller), a price decrease (good 
for the buyer), better margin for the seller, or some 
combination of these.
According to this definition not every new or different 
idea qualifies as an innovation.  In fact only a small 
percentage qualify.  Innovative ideas, by definition, 
create value for their users and valuable competitive 
advantage for their owners, as well as economic 
rewards.
However, even innovations that have only minor 
impact on the market can be significant and critically 
important, especially if they help a company to provide 
its customers with a superior experience.  In this 
context innovation can be used to defend, to block 
competitors from gaining our share even as it can also 
be used to attack.8
Hence, the approach that Peter Drucker labeled as 
“fast-follower” is a useful defensive strategy employed 
by companies to block the growing effectiveness 
of a competitor’s offering.  For example, Netscape 
Navigator had a strong head start in the browser 
market, but Microsoft’s Internet Explorer became a 
fast follower and quickly overtook Netscape, forcing 
it to seek refuge as a subsidiary of AOL.  (AOL grew 
dominant for a short time, acquired Time-Warner, and 
then itself collapsed into near-irrelevance before being 
reinvented.)
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In high tech and particularly software markets, a variant 
on this strategy is known derisively as “vaporware.” 
Here the defense consists of product announcements, 
not actual products.  In the early days of the database 
market, vaporware announcements were prolific, while 
actual new products came trotting along sometimes 
years later.  In the course of one of these transitions 
Borland died a quick death long before its promised 
software reached the market.
While these aspects of innovation and the innovation 
process occur in the life cycles of individual companies, 
innovation is also a significant factor in macroeconomics 
at the level of nations and the economy as a whole. 
Economists know that it is only through effective 
innovation that real economic growth occurs, because 
the underlying economic impact of innovation is to 
make resources more productive, which literally creates 
wealth for society.  Hence, innovation is crucial to the 
economic viability of nations. 
But when discussing innovation the focus must remain 
on individuals and individual companies because it is 
their work that drives the economy forward.  Thus, just 
as innovators drive microeconomic change in specific 
markets and macroeconomic change in economies, 
it is innovators who trigger creative destruction in 
their search for commercial success and competitive 
advantage.  Among the companies widely admired 
today - and we have so far mentioned Google, Amazon, 
Facebook, Charles Schwab, Home Depot, and Fedex - 
most have attained success precisely because they have 
innovated.  Through their innovations they brought 
structural change to their markets; their motivation 
was to gain advantage within the capitalist process 
precisely as Schumpeter described, and they succeeded 
in doing so.
But the innovator’s role is only half of the equation. 
Customers are the ones who determine the value of 
innovations, because they are the ones who pay for 
them.  Market behavior is an aggregate reflection of 
each consumer’s drive to find the most attractive 
offers, and to maximize value received for cost incurred. 
As innovation is the process of creating higher value 
offerings, buyers naturally gravitate to innovative 
products.  
But perhaps “gravitate” is the wrong word.  It is 
more accurate to say that capitalist markets devour 
innovations, hungrily consuming them the way a very 
hungry lion consumes a fresh kill.  The capitalist system 
depends for its dynamism on the market’s appetite 
for innovation, which has shown itself to be generally 
insatiable.
Inherent in the dynamics of market demand is the 
process that drives competition through innovation. 
The waves of change launched by innovators are 
countered by competitors who innovate in order to 
defend their existing positions, or to attack with 
ambitions of their own.  
It’s an endless cycles that serves only to drive the 
process of change still that much faster and more 
widely throughout the economy.  Accelerating change 
and the convergence in the marketplace of many 
competing innovators results in greater complexity 
for all, a landscape of acute danger and astonishing 
challenge.  
Any enterprise that intends to survive must somehow 
innovate, because innovation itself is the only defense 
against innovation.  Through innovation you may catch 
up if you are behind, or even take the lead.
Thus, we see clearly that the future of each and every 
firm is determined largely as a function of its ability 
to innovate effectively.  Innovation is therefore a 
mandate, an absolute requirement for survival.  
And it is a problem.  An enormous, thorny problem for 
enterprises, because managing the innovation process 
is one of the most challenging issues facing any of 
them.  It is extraordinarily difficult to do well, in part 
because, as with top management, R&D organizations 
are often focused on the wrong objectives, as we will 
discuss below.
The Many Dimensions of 
Innovation
Creative destruction is fascinating from a macroeconomic 
perspective, and it raises tough microeconomic 
questions about change and change management in 
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individual firms.  In particular, it brings focus to how 
leaders and managers handle change, and it highlights 
the necessity of constant regeneration of the business 
from within through the R&D process and other creative 
and innovation-seeking endeavors, that is, on activities 
that are directly intentionally at creating innovations.
While leaders of successful companies show a knack for 
reinventing their organizations in clever ways, among 
the failures we see repeatedly the consequences of not 
understanding or following Schumpeter’s advice.  Too 
many managers assume that change is the aberration, 
and they behave as if the market is stable.  Perhaps 
the business school curriculum is partly at fault, for the 
very notion of a Masters in Business Administration 
assumes that the critical competence is administration, 
implying that continuing and well-controlled operation 
under managerial control is the focus, intent, and 
purpose of management.  
For most managers, however, the ability to create is far 
more important to their companies than skills related 
to administrating and controlling.  Furthermore, as 
Russ Ackoff points out, a serious flaw in the traditional 
MBA curriculum is that in the real world managers are 
not presented with tidy and objective “cases” to solve9 
- they must first figure out what the problem is, which 
can itself require a great deal of insight and creativity. 
And for the most part, textbooks don’t help.
In today’s markets change is the norm and stability 
is an aberration.  Leaders grapple with the disruptive 
forces of change and they figure out for themselves 
what lessons and challenges present in the current 
situation, and what responses will be most effective 
in harnessing change so that their organizations can 
survive.  Somewhere in the competitive environment 
it’s likely that a new innovation is about to appear that 
will dramatically impact on the current structures that 
your business depends on.
And yet the relentless day to day demands on every 
manager’s time immerses them in a flood of pressing 
issues, and many simply fail to recognize important 
underlying factors that portend significant disruption. 
Consequently, they tend not to account adequately 
for systemic change, and they are surprised and 
unprepared when they should not be.
Did personal computers and networked workstations 
surprise the computer industry?  Absolutely.  Did the 
high performance sport shoe surprise the staid sneaker 
marketplace when Nike invented the category?  Did 
efficient and high quality Japanese cars surprise the 
Detroit automakers?  Did the cellular telephone shock 
the entrenched telcos? And did the smart phone 
radically disrupt the cell phone makers?  The answer 
to all of these questions, of course, is “Yes.”  This 
can happen only because leaders are looking in the 
rear view mirror, gazing backwards at what they have 
accomplished, instead of forward at what must be 
accomplished.
Occasionally we even see a company whose leaders, 
judging by the evidence of their behavior, prefer 
to go out of business rather than do the work of 
adapting to change.  It can be intellectually as well as 
psychologically difficult to shift the focus from the 
operations mentality and actually confront the need to 
do things in a very different way.
During his tenure as CEO of IBM, during which he turned 
the company from a disastrous decline, Lou Gerstner 
commented that,  “Many successful companies that 
fall on hard times – IBM, Sears, GM, Kodak, Xerox – 
saw clearly the changes in the environment.  But they 
were unable to change highly structured organizational 
cultures that had been born in a different world.”10
Even today, the local Sears store appears to be caught 
in a time warp, its merchandising showing all the 
leading edge ideas of 1975.  Have their merchandising 
directors never seen an Ikea store, much less an Apple 
store?  I don’t have much confidence that Sears will be 
around much longer.  What, one wonders, could they 
possibly be thinking?  But they’re not alone, for as we 
noted at the very beginning of this paper, companies 
are dying every day, even big ones that you’d think 
would know better.
And as Mr. Gerstner points out, a primary reason seems 
to be that some leaders actually make the choice for 
their enterprise to fail, to die, rather than confronting 
the need to change and adapt, that is, to innovate.
And while it is imperative for organizations to be 
continually engaged in the process of innovation, an 
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important question concerns where those efforts to 
innovate should be focused.  Because there are, it turns 
out, a great many possibilities.
To examine this we devised an imaginary and archetypal 
large organization with products and services in many 
different markets, extensive operations in numerous 
locations, and a predominantly internal support 
structure.  We suggest that in such an organization 
there are at least 38 distinctive opportunities for 
innovation.
38 Possible Innovation Targets
The first thing that jumps out from this list is that the 
vast majority of these opportunities do not involve new 
technologies embedded in existing or new products.  In 
spite of the widely-held assumption to the contrary, 
“innovation” is by no means limited to “technology.” 
One of the lessons is that technology innovation by 
itself has rarely been sufficient to ensure the future, 
and it is certainly not today.  Nokia, to go back to that 
sad story, has mountains of great new technology.  In 
its halcyon days, it was one of the world’s greatest 
technology innovators, and its massive R&D budgets 
were the envy of companies worldwide.
But in fact, Nokia’s collapse was one of the most 
effective messengers of an important lesson, which 
is that it’s not a question of how much you spend on 
innovation, but rather the process you use to manage 
that effort.  Booz & Co. has shown us through some 
great research that spending a lot on R&D is surely no 
guarantee of future business success:
Table 1: Possible Innovation Targets
business structure
 alliances
 capital formation
administration
 information flow
 automation
 insourcing / outsourcing services
organization
 structure type
 facilities infrastructure
                  IT infrastructure
 employee / contractor mix
                  employee experience
 decision making processes
 facilities effectiveness
 process to improve processes
customer experience
 communication process
 crm
 brand / image
                  advertising
                 feedback
    
customer service
 service process 
 communication
supply chain
 distribution system
 manufacturing
 communication
               automation
product
 product offering
 product availability    
                  technology (hidden)
 technology (evident)            
 manufacturing
 R&D
 user interface
 packaging
 functionality
 life cycle model
 sales model
                  sustainability
 after-sale service
 distribution
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“Yearly R&D spending among the world’s 1,000 largest 
public corporate R&D spenders has hit a record high 
of US$638 billion, according to global management 
consulting firm Booz & Company in its ninth annual 
Global Innovation 1000 study.  However, despite the 
sustained overall increase in R&D budgets over the last 
decade, this year’s findings show once again that higher 
spending doesn’t guarantee bigger payoffs.  Indeed, 
the 10 most innovative companies our study identified 
this year financially outperformed the world’s top 10 
spenders, despite actually spending significantly less 
on R&D.”11
Interestingly, this is the case even when innovative 
technology is at the core of the offering.  A good example 
is Xerox.  Chester Carlson’s technological innovation 
was a stunning breakthrough, and a testimony to 
his insight and persistence.  The Xerox story is also 
testimony to the difficulties of forecasting the market 
for genuinely new products.  Many industrial giants of 
the day, including IBM, Kodak, and GE each rejected the 
opportunity to acquire Carlson’s technology at bargain 
prices.
When he finally did find a partner, it was tiny Haloid 
Company that stepped up, and together they found 
that getting the technology to market entailed far 
more than simply building new machines.  The success 
of Haloid-become-Xerox in its early years was largely 
due to its innovative approach to distribution - leasing 
the machines on a per-use basis, instead of selling 
them outright.  This brilliant insight propelled Xerox 
into the top echelon of American business, where it 
remained, however, only for a few decades.  Today 
Xerox is a company in difficulty, threatened by far 
more creative competitors whose own innovations in 
distribution and technology have largely surpassed 
Xerox’s.  Again and again we see the inexorable power 
of creative destruction.  
Did Xerox top management believe that the market 
was stable, and that their incumbent competitive 
advantages would persist?  If so, they were clearly 
mistaken, and now another generation of top managers 
has the task of rebuilding the company.12
But the problem was not that Xerox failed to recognize 
the importance of innovation.  In fact, they generously 
funded technical R&D that surpassed the efforts of 
most other companies, creating the legendary Palo 
Alto Research Center, PARC, from which sprang an 
amazing string of enormous breakthroughs in many 
dimensions of technology.  It was at PARC, in fact, 
that the personal computer as we know it today was 
invented.  Not only was the investment substantial, 
but so were the results.
And even as the company entered its period of decline, 
it was still producing astonishing technological 
breakthroughs.  It’s Docutech system, for example, a 
self-contained digital printing plant and bindery, did 
what no copier had done before.  But within a relatively 
short period of time, Xerox competitors had machines 
that matched or surpassed the Docutech.
This illustrates one of the most vexing problems 
associated with technological innovation:  In today’s 
environment, technology is one thing that a determined 
and adequately-financed competitor may readily 
replicate or bypass.  Patents offer limited protection, 
but sometimes they simply provide stimulus and 
insight for others determined to be still more inventive. 
Thus, a focus on technology breakthroughs to the 
exclusion of other aspects of innovation is misplaced. 
Given the complexity inherent in today’s technologies, 
you simply can’t count on being able to out-R&D the 
market on a consistent enough basis to sustain a 
competitive advantage.  Sooner or later, and probably 
sooner, every technology meets its match or its 
superior, and it’s probably coming from a competitor.
But for the brief interval while a particular technology 
is superior, it can be the basis upon which to build 
something of truly critical importance:  strong 
relationships with customers.  Innovation efforts must 
therefore include the creation of new approaches that 
help strengthen the bonds with customers, and they 
should draw from each of the 38 dimensions that might 
provide differentiation.  Strong customer relationships 
help companies survive the inevitable periods when 
their technology will not be the best.
The experience IBM underscores the significance of 
innovation that is not just technological.  Over the 
years, many of IBM’s successes have come not as a 
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result of technological leadership, but because of its 
close relationships with its customers.  IBM was not 
actually a technology leader in many of its product 
areas, but for the decades of the 1970s, ‘80s, and 
‘90s, IT managers struggled with the choice between 
leading edge technology offered by IBM’s competitors, 
and IBM’s own systems, which were often just slightly 
above average.  Because even though its technology 
may not have been the best, IBM made sure that it was 
a “safe choice” for customers because the company 
made consistent and unsurpassed efforts to provide 
exemplary service.  The adage among IT executives was 
that, “Nobody ever got fired for choosing IBM.”
Over the years an increasing proportion of IBM’s 
revenues and profits have come from its services 
organization, and the major transformation led by 
Louis Gerstner was a massive shift from product-based 
revenues to services.  By 2002, services accounted for 
more than 50% of revenues.  So is IBM a computer 
company?  Well, yes.  Its high profile research efforts 
in areas such as super high-density magnetic storage 
drives and the Deep Blue chess-playing supercomputer 
are well publicized initiatives that keep this idea in the 
public’s mind.
But the IBM services organization is far more significant 
today because the relationships that are created and 
sustained through services are the real key to the 
company’s future.  
Ford provides another clear example.  The original 
Ford cars of the early 1900s were certainly innovative 
for automotive engineering, but equally important to 
the company’s success was the innovative production 
process (the first vertically integrated assembly line), 
the distribution system (the dealer network), and the 
company’s pricing model that ensured affordability. 
All of these innovations enabled Ford to create an 
enduring relationship with American car-buyers and 
build a significant share of the market.
By the 1920s, however, GM had copied and largely caught 
up with Ford’s innovations, and began introducing 
some of its own.  A minor GM innovation with major 
impact was the availability of cars in colors other than 
black.13  Ford suffered steady decline thereafter, and 
was rescued from what might have been fatal demise 
only by the enormous demand for military vehicles 
caused by World War II.  After the war, the company 
soon staggered again, and was nearly bankrupt by the 
late 1950s.
The Ford story illustrates two important aspects of 
competition in nearly every market.  First, each industry 
has its own rhythm of technical innovation, driven 
largely by advances in materials and methods.  These 
advances often lead to cycles of changing market 
dominance.  In the auto industry, Ford was supplanted 
by GM, and more recently GM by Toyota and Honda. 
Today, we wonder if Tesla will be a future industrial 
giant.  And what new car company that we haven’t 
heard of yet will be the leader in 2025, or 2035?
The second aspect, however, is what seriously 
complicates the focus on technology.  Ford’s choice of 
black paint was an economic one, part of a relentless 
strategy of minimizing costs.  From 1903 through 
World War I, this strategy was a significant contributor 
to the company’s growth.  But in the 1920s, the nature 
of the market itself was changing, and Ford’s success 
as a cost-cutting pioneer did not serve so well when 
market dynamics began to favor factors related to 
comfort and style.  
The point is that within the framework of any given 
market cycle, a company can grasp and sustain 
leadership.  But the greater challenge is managing 
what happens when a new cycle begins.  As it turns 
out, very few companies sustain leadership positions 
beyond a single cycle because they don’t grasp the 
significance of change.  And this is what makes the 
work of Gerstner so significant at IBM.  In the face of 
a major shift in the market, the company faced the 
choice to reinvent itself or collapse, and Gerstner in fact 
led the process of reinvention with great success.
Many of the negative examples already mentioned 
confirm how extraordinary this was. 
Xerox led the copier market, but has nearly collapsed in 
the age of the PDF.
Kodak was the world’s number one manufacturer of 
film, but collapsed when digital cameras displaced film 
cameras.
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Nokia led the cell phone market, but was not prepared 
for the smart phone market.
Sears led American retail for decades, but lost out 
to Wal-Mart when discounting and supply chain 
management became the key differentiators.
Between 1995 and 2004, Coca-Cola dropped 50% of its 
share price when customers switched their preference 
to healthier beverages (and much as IBM did, it has 
since recovered).
There were many happy and charming bookstores all 
over America until Amazon.com undercut their prices 
by 20 or 30%, and now there are almost none.
So the point is clear – just because the current 
structure of the market favors your solution absolutely 
today, does not mean that the structure of the market 
tomorrow will also favor you.  While one set of products 
and services may be exceptionally well-suited to the 
market at a particular point in time, it’s surprisingly 
rare for a company to successfully adapt its products 
and services to changing market conditions quickly 
enough to sustain its leadership position. 
Chances are they have positioned their defenses in 
a way that leaves them vulnerable, and indeed it is 
common for companies to cede market dominance 
when clever competitors attack them in areas where 
they are not prepared to defend themselves.  
Sears, for example, allowed Wal-Mart to establish 
itself in smaller rural markets that Sears had thought 
unfeasible.  Wal-Mart then applied innovation 
processes throughout its growing supply chain to 
significantly lower its overall operating costs, at which 
point it went after Sears and K-Mart in their urban 
markets.  Sears became a second-tier player almost 
before it realized what had happened, while K-Mart 
soon found itself in bankruptcy.  (And then, strangely, 
CEO Edward Lampert decided that a merger of the two 
failed companies was the best solution for both.  So far 
the results have not been so good.)
Similarly, by focusing on annual style changes in their 
competition with one another, the Detroit automakers 
largely ignored the importance of underlying quality 
improvements.  When quality suddenly became an 
important attribute for American buyers in the 1970s, 
the Japanese manufacturers began taking market 
share.  Before 1980, GM didn’t take the Japanese 
seriously as competitors at all, and it didn’t take the 
issue of quality seriously either.  Today GM is still 
struggling to catch up to Japanese quality standards, 
and as a result GM’s share of the American car market 
declined from 50% to less than 35% between 1980 and 
2000, to 18 % today.
During his unsuccessful 10 years as CEO of GM between 
1998 and 2008, Rick Wagoner saw the company’s 
market valuation drop by 90%, and losses totaled 
more than $80 billion.  This, together with the story 
of Nokia, shows just how bad things can get when a 
company loses its fit with the market, and competitor 
innovations take hold in the market.
It takes exceptional discipline and clarity of vision to 
defend a competitive advantage and carry it through 
to a next generation of offerings, and not to be cruel to 
Mr. Wagoner, but in hindsight he just wasn’t the right 
guy for the job.  
The challenge, particularly for a board of directors, is 
to know who is the right guy, or woman, for the job, 
because the CEO must look after both the current 
business and also the future, and these two facets 
require quite different expertise and viewpoints.
With success comes growth, and as a company 
increases in size and scope, the nature of management’s 
challenges change considerably.  Managing Xerox at 
the start-up stage was an entirely different problem 
than steering the global copier colossus.  
When a company is small, top managers are often 
in direct contact with customers as a natural part of 
their role in the company.  But as they deal with the 
complexities of larger enterprises and multiplying 
layers of organization, they often become further and 
further removed from direct experience of the market. 
Without direct contact they are intuitively forced to 
rely on past experiences, and they have a progressively 
more difficult time hearing the voice a changing market 
that was different than the one they remember.  
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In addition, the need for extensive administration 
ultimately distracts management from the business 
of innovation.  At the same time, dysfunctional and 
bureaucratic behaviors grow endemic inside of large 
organizations, and result in huge distortions to the 
flow of critical information about the changing external 
market.  Corporate politics gets more and more 
attention, and emphasis shifts to internal events, 
while key external factors become obscured from view. 
Meanwhile, change waits for no organization, and 
innovations from competitors are introduced without 
sufficient response.
Hence, it’s one thing to be an innovator in a small 
market, and quite a different matter to bring creative 
drive to a large operation.  As a company grows and 
the stakes become higher, the risks that the small 
company has taken as a matter of course are now 
subjected to a lot more scrutiny, and reaction times 
slow.  Sometimes they slow disastrously.  More levels 
of management have a stake in major decisions; time 
lags in decision making are longer.  In extreme cases, 
“analysis paralysis” sets in.
Smaller, more nimble competitors have less to 
lose, fewer people to convince, and often a sense 
of desperation that sharpens top management’s 
perception of market needs.  In fact, the well-tuned 
senses of entrepreneurial top managers become 
magnets for capital – small, new companies are 
founded specifically to attack new market niches that 
only their entrepreneurs and the capitalists that back 
them even recognize.
The result of this complex process is a pattern that 
repeats with astonishing regularity.  As innovative 
companies grow, they tend to become followers rather 
than leaders.  Nevertheless, their sheer size, combined 
with control of distribution channels, makes them 
formidable competitors even when their subsequent 
innovations are really copies.
Another factor heavily influencing market evolution 
is that at any given time in any given market, only a 
few critical value dimensions yield the key combination 
that proves most attractive to customers.  Whichever 
company happens to have just the right mix available 
gains a temporary advantage, but the emphasis 
remains on “temporary” because the market’s need 
change and very few companies sustain leadership 
over a long period of time.
We find countless examples of companies that have 
distinguished themselves by focusing on one or 
another of the many dimensions of innovation, but 
then faded into obscurity when the dimension in which 
they were particularly strong became a secondary or 
tertiary concern, or a non-concern, of customers.
From a manager’s perspective, however, 38 dimensions 
of innovation presents a daunting challenge.  For old 
school giants such as GE, GM, or IBM and new school 
leaders such as Apple, Google, or Cisco, 38 arenas for 
innovation are clearly too many to address at once, 
which brings us to a critical dilemma that confronts 
managers every day: How to choose?  In what aspects 
of a business should efforts at innovation be focused? 
Should a company apply itself to innovation in its 
products and services, or its brand, or its organization, 
its leadership team, its technology, its capital structure, 
or any of the others among the possible targets.
Or should it choose any of them?
Individual factors may explain the success achieved 
by this or that company in this or that market, but it’s 
obvious that while any of the 38 areas may be important, 
no one of them consistently explains emerging success 
and failure.  Wouldn’t it be far more useful to have a 
robust explanation of the emergent successes as well 
as the astonishing failures, and thereby a better way to 
both examine the competition and to direct innovation 
efforts?  Of course.
In search of such an explanation we could ask, What 
makes Apple, Apple?  What makes Fedex, Fedex?  Or, 
What makes Schwab, Schwab?  Or, What makes Home 
Depot, Southwest Airlines, or any flourishing company 
successful?  Is there a way to accurately describe 
success and to explain how success emerges?  
If we take this question seriously, what we’re really 
looking for is more than innovation localized to a 
particular dimension, but rather a comprehensive 
innovation framework.  
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The Business Model
When you look at our list of 38 possible innovation 
targets you see interesting potentials, but you also see 
a fragmented world.  Viewed as a list of possibilities, 
each target stands separately, interesting perhaps, 
but alone.  This may be useful for analytical purposes, 
but it’s also fundamentally distorted, because by 
looking at an inventory parts you’ll surely not get a real 
appreciation for the whole.  
But what if you could look at the problem of innovation 
as a whole, as one process?  What would you see?  
You might see this:  Yesterday a whole range of tough 
competitors were creating new products, services, 
distribution systems, brands, and infrastructures that 
are bringing change to the market today.  Recognizing 
the imminence of the creative destruction that will 
result from this, we accept the absolute imperative of 
innovation.  
And now we are confronted with the following question: 
How do we innovate with a clear focus not on the parts 
of the system, but the system as a whole?  
To accomplish this we would first have to understand 
what the “whole system” is.  It’s not a particular 
department, a product, a service, or a brand.  It is the 
entire organization together as one thing, working 
together to deliver value.   For this new integrated 
whole to be a useful managerial concept we need to 
give it a name, and design a process through which it 
can help us manage the enterprise more effectively. 
This whole is the “business model,” a comprehensive 
description of business as an integrated system 
functioning in an intimate relationship with the broader 
market.  In this concept, the individual components of 
an organization do not matter as much as the way they 
work together to enable the organization to create 
value and deliver it to customers.  
A business model is therefore a description of a 
whole system, a combination of products and services 
delivered to the market in a particular way, or ways, 
supported by an organization, positioned according to 
a particular branding that, most importantly, provides 
experiences to customers that yield a particular set of 
strong relationships with them.  Further, a business 
model describes how the experiences of creating and 
delivering experiences and value may evolve along with 
the changing needs and preferences of customers.  
To make this approach useful we will need to understand 
some critical characteristics of the whole.  In particular, 
we need to know how this whole is different from the 
parts that comprise it.  
A key insight is that the distinguishing characteristic of 
any system is that its outputs emerge not as a result of 
any single part. but as a result of the way the parts are 
connected together.
An excellent example of such connectedness is an 
airplane.  Each of an airplane’s component parts, 
and even its major sub-assemblies, has the absolute 
tendency to fall towards the ground.  Take them up 
to 35,000 feet and let go, and they invariably tumble 
straight down.  It is only – only, only, only –  when all 
the parts are assembled just so, and working together 
properly, that the system we call the airplane manifests 
“airplaneness,” and actually flies.14
Similarly, a system we call “a company” consists of 
many different parts.  It participates in other systems 
we call “markets,” which in turn are part of a still larger 
system we call “the economy.”  
If you take a part of a company – say the accounting 
department – and put it into a market by itself, what 
you have is approximately … nothing (unless you 
want to run an accounting services company).  The 
accounting department has no relevance outside of the 
larger company because accounting is only meaningful 
when there are transactions that have to be accounted 
for.  
Similarly, manufacturing requires a sales force, 
distribution, and customers.  Marketing has no purpose 
independent of a company’s identity, its products and 
services, and the perceptions of outsiders.
This tells us that the success of a company is not 
attributable just to one or another part, even as the 
reality of flight is most assuredly not an attribute of 
any single part of the airplane.
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There’s another aspect of the airplane analogy that’s 
also important, one that has to do with the process of 
optimization.  Let’s say we have a nicely functioning 
airplane and we want to improve it.  We might want 
to make the engines more powerful so the plane can 
go faster.  But that might put too much stress on 
the airframe, or the wings, or it might change the 
control properties of the plane, and make it unflyable. 
Hence, the ability of the system to function is entirely 
dependent on the mutual fitness of the parts.  No part 
can possibly be optimized except in the context of all 
the rest.  Instead, we must direct our efforts toward 
optimizing the system as a whole. 
The product that cannot reach the customer provides 
no value; the service that cannot be delivered 
provides no value; distribution systems lacking 
effective products provide no value.  Indeed, Coca Cola 
discovered this a decade age, when the world’s most 
proficient marketing machine lost half of its market 
valuation because … the market for Coca Cola stopped 
growing.  This misfit between product and market was 
devastating to stock price, partly because mired in its 
past, the company’s leadership failed to notice what 
was happening.  This oversight enabled Pepsi to shoot 
ahead in terms of market capitalization; it also cost the 
CEO of Coke his job.
Certainly the optimal approach to marketing depends on 
the actual products that you’re manufacturing and the 
customers for whom they’re intended.  Product design, 
manufacturing, marketing, and sales have to fit together, 
and the definition of this fitness is the business model.
Consider another example of what happens when the 
parts don’t fit together well.  Imagine a company with 
an amazing breakthrough technology, but a sales force 
that is incapable of selling it and a senior management 
that is largely indifferent to prospective buyers. 
Actually, that’s not so difficult to imagine;  Xerox had 
this experience.  
After all, Xerox is the company that literally invented 
the personal computer at PARC back in the early 1970s. 
Naturally, Xerox wanted to make money from this profound 
invention, but because Xerox management didn’t actually 
understand who would use the product, or what for, they 
tried to push it through an entirely unsuited distribution 
channel, to a market that was neither prepared for it nor 
able to understand it.  It went nowhere.  
Well, it went nowhere for Xerox that is.  But a few other 
companies did make excellent use of Xerox technology, 
and in subsequent years they have made billions – 
yes, billions – by applying Xerox inventions to their 
own products and services.  In particular, Apple and 
Microsoft were big beneficiaries.  
Now imagine a company with a brilliant sales force 
that is also adept at bringing back news from the 
marketplace, but the company ignores the warnings? 
This happened to IBM, when it overlooked the emerging 
computer workstation market, a device occupying a 
market niche between the PC and the mainframe, and 
allowed Sun to become the market leader when IBM 
failed to even make an attempt to address the new 
client-server IT paradigm.  (Sun, it should be noted, 
also subsequently faltered, and became part of Oracle.)
Or let’s look at cars.  GM has a vast dealer network 
that is deeply embedded in the commercial fabric 
throughout North America (and in fact the entire 
world), but the company somehow couldn’t manage 
to produce an Oldsmobile-branded car that enough 
people actually want to buy.  Although its headquarters 
was packed with thousands of very bright minds, GM 
was compelled by a persistent lack of innovation and a 
chronically worsening shortage of capital to shut down 
the Olds line.  And then it did the same with Saturn, 
Pontiac, and Hummer; the death of these brands was 
another aspect of Rick Wagoner’s unsuccessful legacy.
To repeat, then, a “business model” is a description 
of the entire marketplace and the relationship of the 
company to that commercial environment.  It is a 
precise definition of who customers are, and how the 
company intends to satisfy their needs, both today and 
tomorrow.  A business model also provides a specific 
assessment of today’s competitors, and tomorrow’s, 
and the technologies that are and will be embedded in 
various competing versions of products and services.  
If Xerox had been thinking about its personal computer 
technology in terms of a business model, perhaps 
the results would have been different.  If IBM had 
understood that workstation computing was a new and 
important business model, perhaps Sun would never 
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have attained prominence.  If GM had considered the 
business model underlying its Oldsmobile line, perhaps 
it would still be viable.  In each of these examples it 
is impossible to know the root causes of the problem 
without knowing the actual people involved, but the 
results strongly suggest that top management was 
probably not asking the right questions, and they were 
probably not having the right kind of conversations 
about the future and how to adapt to it.
The realization is that for the company it is the business 
model that matters, and which must drive any new 
approach the competitive marketplace as well as how 
it should organize itself to compete.  This gives us a 
new way to think about adapting to change, or how to 
create it.  Today and going forward what we’re talking 
about is not just competition between companies, but 
competition between business models.  
Or, in other words, Business Model Warfare.  
Business model warfare characterizes the process 
of winning and losing that marks the creatively 
destructive marketplace, and enables us to define a 
set of principles and skills that will allow managers to 
be effective at this game.  Not that it’s a new game, 
however.  This is the way business has always been; 
and for just as long, managers have been falling into 
the trap of focusing too much on today and not enough 
on tomorrow.   
Winning and Losing at Business 
Model Warfare
As we have noted, in addition to erroneous assumptions 
about stability, managers also fall into the trap of 
focusing too much of their attention inside their own 
organizations.  This is a particular danger with middle 
managers who are under pressure from upper levels 
in the hierarchy of organizational authority.  Their 
instinctive and entirely logical sense of self-protection 
forces them to pay great attention to the behavior and 
desires of senior management, but sadly less attention 
is often paid to customers.
To engage in business model warfare, managers 
cannot be internally focused on products, services, 
or administration to the exclusion of the critical 
relationships between these elements, and the even 
more crucial interactions between a company and its 
customers.  Remember the metaphor of the airplane, 
and the critical role of the connections in its capacity to 
fly.  Thinking about innovation in the business model 
as a matter of the overall relationship between the 
company and its customers, rather than innovation 
isolated in this or that aspect, may therefore yield 
greater insight and better management performance: 
it’s not a coincidence that the winners in business 
model warfare are usually those who manage their 
customer relationships in the most effective ways 
possible, by creating compelling experiences across 
many different dimensions.
Some examples:
Japanese auto manufacturers are the source of many 
business model innovations, and when they applied 
their increasing expertise in manufacturing quality to 
create new, affordable high-end product lines, and now 
Lexus, Acura, and Infiniti, they created products among 
the most admired cars worldwide, and enormously 
profitable segments of their businesses.  
They continue to steadily increase their share of the 
American auto market.  Further, Toyota’s innovations 
in alternative fuels with they hybrid Prius line, far in 
advance of American manufacturers, won it added 
market share as buyers develop a preference for fuels 
other than oil.  The Prius was the best selling car in 
California in 2013.
Looking to Europe, retailing giants Auchan and 
Carrefour redefined the French grocery business in 
the 1960s by applying new cash register technology to 
create the hypermarket, and at about the same time 
Novotel introduced a new kind of hotel.
In the 1970s, Nike redefined the nature of competition 
in the sports shoe and sports apparel business by 
transforming star athletes into marketing icons, first 
with runner Steve Prefontaine and later with Michael 
Jordan.  In so doing, Nike created new markets for its 
shoes and clothing, and surpassed Adidas to become 
the global leader in a ruptured market.  Nike’s core 
business model innovation was turning its own brand 
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into a key element in the self-identity of its customers, 
which comes pretty close to the ideal when we’re talking 
about the company-customer relationship.  Nike, in 
fact, elevated brand management to unprecedented 
heights, and has demonstrated how central the concept 
of brand management is in today’s market.
American Express once dominated the credit card 
industry, and carefully cultivated an image of prestige 
and exclusivity.  Visa entered into competition by 
creating a global network that was far more fluid, 
flexible, and low cost, and has far surpassed American 
Express.  Visa charges lower rates to merchants, 
making its services more attractive, and built its brand 
on ubiquity – Visa cards are available and accepted 
everywhere.  Visa’s first forty years prior to its recent 
IPO were built on an organizational innovation of the 
first caliber, developed by Dee Hock and now articulated 
by him as an example of the “chaordic” organization, 
one that effectively balances chaos and order in service 
to continuous innovation and adaptation.
Dell created a commercial powerhouse by completely 
re-inventing the manufacturing and distribution 
process and building machines to order, rather than to 
inventory, thereby introducing an entirely new business 
model to the personal computer industry.  Mass 
customization at a competitive price defined a new 
kind of customer relationship in the PC industry.  But in 
an impressive display of changing market structures, 
the company’s unique business model lost its charm, 
and founder Michael Dell took the company private in 
2013 in his attempt to recreate the magic of its past.
Southwest Airlines developed an approach to the 
airline business unlike any of the airlines that were 
established when the company was founded, and 
has sustained its unique business model to become 
the most financially successful company in a highly 
troubled industry for the decades leading up to the 
systemic crisis in airline industry that resulted from the 
terror attacks of September 11, 2001.  
One of the most interesting things about Southwest 
is that there isn’t much technology evident in the 
business.  What is apparent is that the leaders of 
Southwest thought through the air travel business in a 
comprehensive way, and avoided falling into traps that 
hurt others.  The company is not burdened by restrictive 
labor agreements that now weigh so heavily on its 
competitors; by design, the company did not operate 
out of airports that charged high fees; and it still does 
not participate in centralized reservations systems. 
The company has not attempted to be something that 
it is not, a mighty global airline, but has instead focused 
on understanding its niche and serving it profitably. 
Exemplars
As we examine industry after industry, we see that 
wherever there is an exemplar, a company that stands 
head and shoulders above others, that company is 
almost always a business model innovator, and is 
applying creativity across many dimensions of customer 
experience to become that market leader.  This does not, 
however, mean that every business model innovator is 
also a market leader, for innovation is a risky enterprise. 
Many new business models fail, just as old ones do.
Like Southwest, Fedex is most notable not so much for the 
pioneering idea of overnight delivery, nor for its innovative 
use of information technology to track packages, nor its 
positioning as a reliable, courteous, and service-oriented 
alternative to the post office.  No, it is all of these factors, 
and more, integrated together, as a coherent system.  The 
fusion of these elements into an effective organization 
is precisely what we mean by the business model.  And 
when we compare the Fedex model with the US Post 
Office model, we see consistent innovativeness on one 
side and astonishing stagnation on the other.  Fedex has 
a history of change and development that the post office 
lacks.  Certainly the post office is hampered by its own 
history as a government agency, its rigid labor relations, 
and even by its extremely broad mission.  Just as certainly 
we see a business model that is failing, one that is losing 
market share and buckets of money, and facing a host of 
competitors as it becomes marginalized on the fringe of 
economic viability.
It’s interesting to see how the post office did attempt 
to defend itself from Fedex.  In the mid-1990s the post 
office introduced a guaranteed 2-day delivery service in 
a package very similar to Fedex’s, and available at just 
25% of the cost.  After a while, however, it became 
apparent that 2-day service wasn’t actually a guarantee, 
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just an intention.  While for many customers this may 
have been acceptable, it shows how little the post office 
management understood that Fedex’s reputation for 
reliable execution was as important as the fact of its 
timely deliveries.  Aside from its questionable notion of 
what constitutes acceptable delivery, it’s probably a moot 
point until the post office realizes that another element 
of its business model is obsolete, namely the requirement 
that customers must wait in long lines to get service.  If 
the post office ever wises up and solves either or both 
of these two problems, Fedex will have someone besides 
the brown trucks of UPS to worry about.
Home Depot also exemplifies the successful integration 
of numerous factors to create a business that is 
so appealing to customers and so devastating to 
competitors.  Impressive scale on two dimensions – 
gigantic stores and a huge number of them – leads to 
high sales volume that enables the company to pay and 
charge the lowest prices.  The local hardware store or 
lumber yard can’t compete unless it, too, undertakes its 
own business model innovation and positions itself as 
something that Home Depot cannot be.   Which would be 
highly personalized service, fast transactions, proximity, 
better selection, different products ….  Ace has recognized 
this as its niche, in which it is doing quite well, positioned 
as the anti-Home Depot, and also demonstrating how the 
evolution of business models creates new opportunities.
So what we see consistently across all of these examples, 
and with widespread consistency across the entire history 
of business, is the following:
It’s rarely, if ever, a single innovation that propels a 
business to success.  It is, instead, a suite of innovations 
that complement one another and work together to 
provide a novel or distinctive value proposition that 
underlies success.  The key is not necessarily the product 
or service itself – which could be highly innovative or even 
just acceptable – but something brought to market in an 
innovative way, supported in an innovative way, branded 
in an innovative way, and in the end always an approach 
that builds enduring relationships between the company 
and its customers.
Furthermore, the core of the innovation value proposition 
need not be built around a technology per se.  In the 
examples cited above – Toyota, Honda, Nike, Visa, Fedex, 
Home Depot, Southwest Airlines, and Ford (in the early 
days) – proprietary technologies do play a part in the 
company’s success, but there is always much more later. 
The key to success is a focus not only on technology 
itself, but technology applied in a business process to 
optimize the relationship between the company and its 
customers.  
In today’s environment nearly any technology can be, has 
been, and will be copied, so the important competitive 
advantage is knowing how to use the technology in a 
way that adds the greatest value for customers.  When 
enough people believe that a $45,000 Lexus performs 
as well as or better than a $65,000 Mercedes, it is then 
that the structure of the market undergoes a profound 
change.   
With all of this in mind, we now have a better way 
to characterize marketplace competition, creative 
destruction, and innovation.  We see that effective 
innovation is not a matter of exploiting individual 
technologies, nor of exceptional performance in any other 
individual element of a business, but rather a matter of 
harnessing the business model itself, which may but 
does not necessarily include technologies among its 
many possible dimensions.  
To state it more simply, what’s happening continuously in 
the marketplace is competition between business models 
themselves.  The Lexus business model is different than 
Ford’s business model, or that of Mercedes, etc.  
What this means is that the winners at business model 
warfare have generally applied innovation to create 
competitive advantages, building stronger relationships 
with customers by developing business models that 
fit closely with customer needs and preferences across 
multiple dimensions.
Winners who have figured out these principles then seek 
to sustain their advantages through further business 
model innovations that defend newly-won territory and 
extend into new domains.  It is therefore the business 
model itself that must be the focus of innovation, and 
innovation in any or all of the 38 possible dimensions 
must be undertaken in service to a larger framework that 
is defined by the business model itself.  
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Part III:  Mapping the Future
As I mentioned above, during the last ten years we’ve 
had ample opportunities to explore business model 
innovation in our work with organizations in a great 
many industries, and to develop tools and models that 
our clients have used to help them chart their future 
course.  One of those tools has proven particularly use-
ful, and I would like to introduce it to you here.  We like 
it because it is both an analytical and a predictive tool, 
and because it seems to explain a great deal of what’s 
actually happening.
In particular, we wish to address these questions:
Where are we today, where are our competitors, and in 
which direction lies our future?
What business models will be successful in the future? 
In which direction should we direct our innovation ef-
forts?
In response to these questions we have devised a mar-
ket map as a simple matrix.  We label the horizontal 
axis “market size,” and the vertical axis “customiza-
tion” (or “differentiation”). 
by accident, but a central element of the company’s 
value proposition.  Hence, the lower right hand corner 
of the matrix designates the largest mass market, the 
one with the lowest prices and the least customization. 
In the US we have a company called “the dollar store” 
that occupies that spot.  Everything in the store, pre-
dictably, costs $1.  
Moving from bottom to top, meanwhile, means in-
creasing customization and differentiation.  Therefore, 
the upper left corner is where you’ll find the exclusive 
products that only the richest people in the world can 
buy.  Private yachts and jets, Picasso and Van Gogh 
paintings, mountain-top estates and private islands.
The lower left corner of the matrix is a therefore a Dead 
Zone – if there were such a thing as high prices and no 
customization, this is where you would find it.  
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Figure 2
Moving from left to right means accessing more cus-
tomers, which in turn implies that the price decreases. 
Hence, the business model intent of both Wal-Mart 
and Ikea is to move progressively to the right.  “Lower 
prices every day” is not a Wal-Mart advertising slogan 
No business would consciously choose to occupy this 
spot.  
What this map enables us to do, therefore, is to 
determine our relative place in the market, to study the 
behavior of our competition, and then to help us plot 
our future course.  
As an example of how we can use the model, let’s take 
the hypothetical example of Sears, which as I noted, 
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was at one time the dominant American retailer, an 
innovative company that grew to enormous size and 
influence.  Sears did this by offering great value, and it 
was very specifically targeted at the core of the market. 
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customer expectations put it squarely in the expanding 
Dead Zone.  
Both as a matter of its business design and its 
marketing, it strived to be the iconic American retailer. 
Headquartered in the center of the country, in Chicago, 
the company exuded confidence and reliably produced 
handsome profits for many years.  Figure 3 shows 
Sears happily at core in 1980.
However, Sears had a young rival at that time, and 
within 20 years the rival had far surpassed it.  Wal-
Mart out-innovated Sears, and while Sears suffered 
significant declines, Wal-Mart grew very fast, both in 
the US and throughout the world.
Our market map of 2000 shows that the overall size 
of the market has grown significantly, which reflects 
the normal process of economic growth.  The map 
also mentions a key factor, which is that overall 
customer expectations changed from 1980, and parts 
of the market that were quite viable in 1980 have 
been overtaken by the dead zone by 2000.  Sears, 
which stayed resolutely where it was, and therefore 
did not adequately innovate its business, was simply 
swallowed up by the staying the same.  Changing 
Wal-Mart, however, demonstrated the qualities 
necessary for continued success.  By developing new 
innovations in its supply chain, product designs, 
and in fact across the entire scope of its business 
model, it succeeded in moving its business model 
both upward, with higher quality products, and to 
the right, with progressively lower prices.  (figure 5) 
(It should be noted that Wal-mart’s employment 
policies remain controversial, and one can argue that 
its success is based in part on a practice of under-
paying its employees by manipulating the labor laws 
of the US. For the purposes of this paper we leave this 
issue aside, but we acknowledge the ethical problems 
associated with this practice, and the likelihood 
that future changes to its business model may be 
forthcoming as a result.)
Wal-Mart, and another successful business model 
innovator Ikea, both continue to aspire to move 
both up, toward more customization, and to the 
right, toward ever lower prices.  And so do all of their 
competitors.  Including, of course, Amazon.  
By 2020 we can easily imagine Sears totally buried in 
the Dead Zone, and indeed with a massive infusion 
of innovation it’s hard to imagine Sears surviving at 
all, while Wal-mart will probably continue to move up 
Figure 4
Figure 3
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and to the right, even as the Dead Zone chases it up 
and outward.  Hence, the Wal-mart of 2020 will be 
the same as the Wal-mart of 1980 in name only, as 
creative destruction chases it ever forward.
So they will ask themselves how else they can customize 
the experience of shopping with them?  Amazon does 
so through its delivery services, and its offer to get your 
purchase to you within two days, or a day, or even hours 
in some cases.  Amazon also offers recommendations 
customized to your interests, based on statistical 
analysis of the behavior of millions of its customers. 
How will Wal-mart do that?
Netflix does the same thing, and because viewer 
recommendations are so important to its business, in 
2009 the company Netflix sponsored a contest in which 
it paid a prize of $1 million to the programmers that best 
improved the accuracy of user recommendations.  It’s 
quite obvious that the goal of the prize is also to move 
Netflix up on the map, toward still better customization.
You might also be able to use this map to help you think 
about the future of your business, and to compare your 
own company’s performance to your competitors, as 
we have compared Sears and Wal-mart.   As another 
example, let’s look at Mercedes and Lexus.  Earlier I 
mentioned that a $45,000 Lexus competes successfully 
with a $65,000 Mercedes, which on the map looks 
something like this.  
The $20,000 Chevrolet, meanwhile, purposefully sits 
in the center of the market, similar in brand identity 
and corporate culture to Sears.  For a long time this 
was a profitable spot, but no more.  So like Sears it was 
swallowed up by growing customer expectations.  The 
failure of Chevrolet to innovate was indeed a big part of 
the problems  that Rick Wagoner was unable to fix, and a 
significant contributor to the drastic decline of GM.
The point of all this is obviously that you can also use this 
framework to think about the aspects or dimensions of 
your business where customization can be offered, and 
where it can be improved by lowering prices, thereby 
moving your entire business model continually upward 
and to the right.  This may not be optional, and indeed, 
when we look at the companies that have failed, we often 
see that their competitors offered either lower prices, or 
more customized solutions, or both.  
For example, you may remember that in its early days, 
Google had a lot of search engine competitors, but over 
time they have all fallen away simply because the search 
results that Google provided were simply better, i.e., more 
customized to the specific requirements of searchers. 
Remember, though, that this does not mean that Google 
will forever be entrenched as the exemplary occupant of 
the g-spot (in which case the name of that spot on the 
matrix may have to be changed), because there is no end 
to the business factors that could become important in a 
future market, and which some firm other than Google 
may master.  As I noted above, it is very often when the 
key drivers of competition change that old companies are 
pushed aside, and new ones take their places as leaders. 
And this happens precisely because it is the new firms 
that master then new competitive factors first.
To take the example of but one company, we may be 
looking at such a process right now with Microsoft.  The 
company is a tech colossus, dominant in many fields, but 
still struggling to adapt to change.  Sales of the PC are 
declining worldwide, down 10% from 2012 to 2013.  Sales 
of tablets, on the other hand, increase, but Microsoft 
is not benefitting significantly from this because it 
did not foresee that market, and came quite late with 
its Surface.  Microsoft Office and Microsoft Windows 
remain dominant software products for PCs, but if PC 
sales continue to fall, then the company will find itself 
fighting a rear guard action to preserve the past, rather 
IN
CR
EA
SI
NG
 
CU
ST
OM
ER
EX
PE
CT
AT
IO
NS
SEARS 
2020?
CU
S
T
O
M
IZ
A
T
IO
N
MARKET SIZE
M
O
R
E
BIGGER
LUXURIES;
DIFFERENTIATED 
MARKETS
SMALL
N
O
N
-C
U
S
T
O
M
IZ
E
D
DEAD ZONE
COMMODOTIES;
MASS MARKET
WALMART
2020?
1980
2000
Figure 6
Journal of Business Models (2013), Vol. 1, No. 1 pp. 13-37
33
than a proactive one to create the future.  We could well 
foresee that when PC sales drop below some currently-
unknown threshold that Microsoft may follow in the 
footsteps of Nokia or Kodak, passing the threshold of 
non-sustainability below which the company implodes.
But the leaders of Microsoft are obviously very smart, 
and they see what’s happening as well or better than us 
outsiders.  So will they lead their company to create the 
next generations of products and services and business 
models to sustain Microsoft in the years ahead?  Will 
they be able to create better business model and new 
products and services that move up and to the right on 
the matrix, faster and better than their competitors? 
The hypothesis of this paper, and the logic of business 
model warfare, suggests that this should be one of 
their overriding objectives, and perhaps a convenient 
(although certainly quite simplified) way to assess any 
given decision or proposed initiative.
We will follow this closely, but no matter what happens, 
it seems that concepts and principles explored here may 
be useful as we seek to understand the patterns of 
change in the marketplace, and to predict the outcomes 
of decisions yet to be made.
The upper right corner, meanwhile, remains an interesting 
sort of business Nirvana.  Here you might find an entirely 
customized product, which is affordable by literally 
everyone, because it’s free.  But surely this could not be 
the location of any company, for how would it survive?
In fact, however, there are currently two companies 
occupying that corner, and their astounding success 
has been achieved precisely because their product (well, 
service really) is utterly free and yet totally customized to 
the uniqueness of your specific requirements.  
One of these companies is Google, which is happy to 
provide you with a fully customized web search at any 
time, day or night.  It takes only milliseconds, and it did 
this approximately 2 trillion times in 2013, or 6 billion 
times per day, 4 million per minute, and thus 70,000 per 
second.  (I found that out by doing a Google search, of 
course.15) 
It is in honor of Google that I have named the sweet 
spot in the upper right corner, somewhat tongue in 
cheek, the “g-spot.”  (I hope they don’t mind.)  Google’s 
business model has created a good number of billionaires 
precisely because it is so well and uniquely positioned, 
and also because they do seem to fully understand the 
extraordinary position they occupy, and because they are 
managing the firm to exploit and extend their significant 
advantage.  
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Microsoft’s Bing, meanwhile, plays fast follower.  (It 
is a position we are accustomed to seeing a Microsoft 
product occupy.)
The other company now occupying the g-spot, beside 
Google, is Facebook (the “f-spot”?), which is also free.
Interestingly, Facebook is also built entirely on the 
concept of total customization, but in Facebook’s case, 
the customization is provided by you, the user.  And 
nearly a billion of us are happy to oblige.  Facebook has 
also created billionaire owners, and they also seem to 
understand their unique situation.
Actually, Google also relies on us to customize, as we 
are the one who are creating the 180 million + web 
sites that Google then searches for us, for free.  This 
profound partnership between content creators (us), 
platform creators such as Facebook, and content 
locators such as Google and Bing, constitutes a hugely 
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significant phenomenon for future business model 
innovators to understand, exploit, and further develop. 
It is here that we can anticipate many surprises in the 
future, particularly as computers become faster, more 
powerful, and less expensive.  
Oh, wait… there’s another example where the model 
shows its validity.  The PC itself, as s device, has gotten 
considerably less expensive, massively more powerful, 
and exceptionally more customizable, over the last 30 
years.  The entire PC industry has moved significantly 
up and to the right, especially if you consider your 
smart phone to be a PC, which would be an accurate 
characterization.  Today’s iPhone, for example, 
is the rough equivalent in computing power of a 
supercomputer from three decades ago.  Now, if the 
folks at Nokia had been thinking about their product in 
these terms, rather than as  “cell phone,” then perhaps 
they would have been better prepared for what the 
iPhone did to their business model.
So you get the point.  For the majority of companies 
that operate in the physical world of products and 
services, for which they must charge money to survive, 
the g-spot is an enticing destination that they will 
never actually attain, but toward which they must 
always strive.  Although I have indeed tried, I have yet 
to identify any competitive advantage that cannot 
be represented on the map, which suggests that it 
may valid very broadly.   (If you can think of counter-
examples, I would be happy to learn about them from 
you.)
E-world companies, meanwhile, can and quite happily 
do occupy that coveted spot.
Summary of 
Business Model Warfare
There is of course a lot more that could be said, but we’ll 
leave that for another time.  For now, I’ll summarize 
the concept of Business Model Warfare in these 
propositions: 
One:  A “business model” defines a broad competitive 
approach to business, and articulates how a company 
applies processes and technologies to build and 
sustain effective relationships with customers.  The 
experiences that customers have, and the relationships 
that companies build with customers, are the most 
critical factors.  Creating them, understanding them, 
preserving them, enriching them, and extending them 
are the critical attributes of success.  Everything that is 
done must be in service to these relationships; they are 
the point.
Two:  Every successful business model earns some sort 
of competitive advantage to the extent that it serves 
successful relationships.  However, any advantage 
may disappear overnight should a competitor devise 
a superior model, thereby displacing the company in 
the relationship with the customer.   We can visualize 
that relationship by understand the market as a two-
dimensional map, on which we plot market size (i.e., 
price), and product//service customization.  These 
two dimensions tell us a great deal about the value 
proposition underlying any business model.
Due to competitive forces, the life span of every 
business model is therefore limited, and due to the 
general unpredictability of change, its time frame is 
indeterminate.  Leaders who have the good fortune to 
preside over a successful business model should never 
lose sight of the ephemeral nature of their advantages, 
and must focus not only on administering the (illusory) 
stability of today, but on preparing for or precipitating 
the inevitable change of tomorrow by understanding 
how costs can be lowered while customization is 
simultaneously increased.
Three:  Since business models themselves are a more 
comprehensive way of understanding the focus 
of competition, they must also become a focus of 
innovation itself.  Relentlessly changing conditions 
means that business models evolve rapidly, and 
business model innovation is therefore not optional. 
While innovations in any area within an organization 
may be important, innovations that pertain broadly and 
directly to the business model will be life-sustaining.
Four:  The model tells us that we must aspire to move 
upward and to the right, and that the dead zone is 
chasing us that way.  If we stop, the dead zone threatens 
to swallow us, as indeed it has done for so many failed 
business models.
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Five:  Based on what we have discussed here, the 
pattern of company mortality is a real and significant 
phenomenon, a result of the acceleration of change 
throughout the economy that operates on both demand 
and supply.  Demand is enormously influenced by 
innovation - new products and services coming into 
the market significantly affect the fate of all market 
participants.  
The perspective from the supply side is a bit more 
complicated, but the pattern is also evident.  Because 
the market is so transparent and the performance of 
every public company is subject to detailed scrutiny 
by investors and analysts, subtle changes in an 
organization’s performance can lead to broad swings in 
stock price.  
Improving performance and increasing stock price are 
both self-feeding cycles that create more favorable 
conditions for companies to develop and implement 
future innovations, both by improving stock currency for 
making acquisitions and by lowering the overall cost of 
capital.  Conversely, declining performance and a falling 
stock price can lead to a downward spiral that makes it 
progressively more difficult for companies to compete 
for attractive acquisition fodder, and which can also 
increase the cost of capital that could be invested in 
innovation-related activities such as R&D and product 
development.  Get ahead and push farther ahead; get 
behind and fall farther behind.
The data cited here show that over the medium term the 
majority of companies will get trapped in the downward 
spiral and one way or another most will disappear. 
The prevalence of this trap suggests that while leaders 
may be thinking and worrying about change and its 
impact on their companies, about competition and about 
competitive advantage, many have been doing so in a 
way that is simply not effective.  Hence, we suggest that 
thinking about and enacting business model innovation 
may be a productive exercise for established businesses.
And the need for good thinking about business models 
is as important for new businesses as it is for old ones, 
and among the many examples consider the spectacular 
rise and equally spectacular collapse of Webvan, in which 
more than a billion dollars of capital was invested … and 
lost.  Its management team – including a renowned CEO 
who had formerly been the head of Andersen Consulting 
– was so confident of what they were doing (i.e., their 
business model) that they invested hundreds of millions 
of dollars of capital in a distribution infrastructure, even 
though market demand that would generate a return 
was completely unproven.  They believed that they 
could make the business work, and apparently fooled 
themselves into thinking that their own belief was 
sufficient basis for betting massive capital on a business 
model that had never actually been fully tested.  In the 
end, hundred-million-dollar warehouses were built but 
never used, never generating even a cent of return.
Thus, in spite of abundant talk about change, the 
temptation to build a business according to a fixed 
structure that is expected to endure for the long term 
remains strong.  Never mind that the long term is 
completely unpredictable.  Another way to say this 
is that such a management approach that remains 
unrepentantly focused on stability and continuity, 
instead of on disruption and change, will be unpleasantly 
surprised in the end.
For these reasons it will remains imperative to discuss 
managing for change as an absolute requirement, but 
many (most?) business leaders nevertheless still aren’t 
very good at dealing with it.  Recognizing change in the 
marketplace, anticipating, and adapting to its turbulent 
evolution, these are the challenges that confront all 
executives, for although we remember periods that 
seemed stable, they are in fact long gone and never to 
return.
As markets continue to evolve and competition becomes 
ever more demanding, engaging in Business Model 
Warfare therefore becomes not just an interesting 
possibility, but perhaps a requirement. To survive, all 
organizations must develop comprehensive innovation 
frameworks, and perhaps the perspective offered by the 
Business Model Warfare framework can help leaders to 
be more effective. 
In the end, when we look at the business world it’s clear 
that the story of change is still the important story to 
tell, and the process of leading an organization in the 
face of change remains the critical skill.  
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